Is Canada’s Right Wing Extremist Ecosystem Entering a Higher Risk Phase?

Recent developments underscore that Canada’s contemporary white-nationalist ecosystem has moved beyond online radicalization and is now producing credible real-world risk, even when formal organizational membership is unclear.

A public RCMP announcement issued December23, 2025 describes a serious criminal case involving an individual alleged to have engaged with extremist online spaces and to have articulated violent intent. While there is no public evidence that the individual was a formal member of Second Sons, the case is notable because the individual:

• participated in overlapping online spaces, and
• was known to at least some individuals within that milieu.

This distinction matters. It reinforces a key analytic finding: formal membership is not necessarily a primary risk indicator. The threat now also comes from loosely affiliated individuals who absorb ideology, moral permission, and tactical imagination from shared spaces.

WHAT HAS CHANGED

1. From Groups to Ecosystems: What began as personality-driven livestream communities (Plaid Army / Diagolon) has evolved into a layered ecosystem:

• Militant and preparatory spaces (Second Sons, Active Clubs)
• Political laundering initiatives (Dominion Society)
• Cultural and propaganda networks (Diagolon mythos, podcasts, online chats)

The RCMP case highlights that actors can move through this ecosystem without ever formally “joining” a group, while still internalizing violent narratives.

2. Formal Membership Is Not Necessarily the Primary Risk Signal: The individual referenced in the December 23 RCMP release illustrates a pattern seen repeatedly in IMVE-X cases:

• Engagement in extremist spaces
• Social familiarity with known extremists
• Consumption of violent rhetoric framed as hypothetical or humorous
• Escalation toward individualized action

Why this matters: Journalistic and policy frameworks that focus narrowly on “card-carrying members” will miss a growing share of the threat.

3. Two-Track Messaging Continues to Obscure Risk: Public facing content emphasizes:

• fitness,
• camaraderie,
• “heritage,”
• and sanitized policy language such as “remigration.”

Private or semi-private channels increasingly contain:

• explicit dehumanization,
• praise or minimization of Nazi ideology,
• fantasies of deportation enforced by violence,
• execution rhetoric directed at politicians, journalists, or perceived enemies.

The RCMP case reinforces how private rhetoric can matter more than public branding.

THE ROLE OF INFIGHTING — AND WHY IT DOES NOT NECESSARILY REDUCE DANGER

Factionalism and internal disputes are a constant feature of far-right movements. Importantly:

• Infighting does not reliably lead to disengagement
• It may push some individuals toward more extreme positions
• “Losers” of factional struggles are disproportionately represented among lone-actor cases

The RCMP case aligns with this pattern: radicalization without durable organizational attachment, driven instead by ideological exposure and grievance reinforcement.

CURRENT THREAT ASSESSMENT (CANADIAN IMVE CONTEXT)

Taken together, the trajectory of this ecosystem now shows:

• Delegitimization of democratic authority
• Moral permission for violence framed as defensive or inevitable
• Euphemized policy violence (“remigration”)
• Increasingly explicit violent hypotheticals
• Individuals acting independently of formal group structures

This places the movement in late-stage IMVE mobilization, with heightened lone-actor and small cell risk.

LIKELY TRAJECTORY (2026–2028)

Most Likely Outcome

• Continued recruitment via sanitized fronts
• Persistent online radicalization pipelines
• More cases involving loosely affiliated individuals, rather than formal members
• Sporadic acts of violence or attempted violence, often framed as personal grievance rather than organizational action

Best Case Outcome

• Sustained exposure and disruption reduce recruitment efficiency
• Infighting degrades trust and coordination
• Fewer real-world actions, though online extremism persists

Worst Case Outcome

• A hardline faction or individual treats ongoing legal or political events as a trigger
• Transition from rhetoric to action without centralized command
• Serious violent incidents carried out by actors who are “adjacent” rather than officially enrolled

EARLY WARNING INDICATORS

Particular attention should be paid to:

• Individuals active in multiple overlapping extremist spaces
• Escalating rhetoric despite lack of formal membership
• Shift from ironic or hypothetical language to personal resolve
• Expressions of isolation, betrayal, or urgency
• Withdrawal from public platforms combined with fixation on grievance

IMPLICATIONS FOR JOURNALISTS

• Avoid treating lack of formal membership as exculpatory
• Contextualize online engagement as a risk factor, not a curiosity
• Report on ecosystems and pathways, not just organizations
• Be cautious about framing arrests as isolated anomalies

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS

• Prevention strategies must focus on spaces and narratives, not just groups
• Lone-actor risk is now a primary IMVE-X concern
• Disrupting recruitment and radicalization pathways is as critical as enforcement

BOTTOM LINE

The most serious IMVE-X risks in Canada increasingly come from individuals who are connected by ideology and social familiarity, not exclusively from formal membership.

The ecosystem remains small but highly adaptive, and its capacity to inspire violence no longer depends on command-and-control structures.

The question for 2026 and beyond is not whether further cases will emerge, but how effectively warning signs are recognized before they do.

ALIGNING THE RISK-INDICATOR MATRIX WITH CANADIAN IMVE FRAMEWORKS

Canada uses Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism (IMVE) as an umbrella category, articulated by bodies including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Public Safety Canada, CSIS, and provincial integrated threat assessment units.

IMVE is typically broken into:

• IMVE-P (Politically motivated)
• IMVE-R (Religiously motivated)
• IMVE-X (Xenophobic / ethno-nationalist, including white nationalism)

The Diagolon → Second Sons → Active Club → Dominion Society ecosystem sits squarely in IMVE-X, with periodic overlap into IMVE-P (anti-government accelerationism).

CANADIAN IMVE STAGES vs. YOUR ESCALATION MATRIX

STAGE A — IMVE Early Radicalization (RCMP / Public Safety: “Grievance Formation”)

Corresponds to: Level 1–2 (Performative Grievance & System Delegitimization)

Indicators

• Anti-media narratives (“CBC lies”)
• Claims of censorship and persecution
• Electoral distrust without violence advocacy

Canadian assessment

• Not criminal
• High normalization risk
• Primary concern: recruitment pipeline

What Canadian agencies watch

• Platform growth
• Narrative consistency
• Movement of followers between networks

STAGE B — IMVE Ideological Hardening (“Moral disengagement and delegitimization of democratic authority”)

Corresponds to: Level 3–4 (Defensive Violence Framing & Inevitability)

Indicators

• “We don’t want violence, but…”
• “No political solution”
• Celebration of foreign extremist violence
• Framing state as illegitimate or tyrannical

Canadian assessment

• Pre-criminal but dangerous
• Key transition point in IMVE cases

Red flag for analysts

• Explicit rejection of non-violent political processes

STAGE C — IMVE Mobilization (“Preparation for violence or violent intent signalling”)

Corresponds to: Level 5–6 (Identity Hardening & Euphemized Policy Violence)

Indicators

• Ethnic framing (“replacement,” “remigration”)
• Fitness / combat training
• Uniforms, banners, masked demonstrations
• Sanitized public messaging + violent private rhetoric

Canadian assessment

• High-risk IMVE-X
• Often linked to:
• Active Clubs
• Paramilitary aesthetics
• Ideological purification (purges, splits)

RCMP framing

“Groups that blend extremist ideology with physical preparedness represent elevated threat trajectories.”

STAGE D — IMVE Intent Articulation (“Credible violent extremist intent”)

Corresponds to: Level 7 (Explicit Violent Intent)

Indicators

• Calls for deportation “at gunpoint”
• Advocacy of executions
• Praise for Nazis or genocidal regimes
• Open talk of “race war is here”

Canadian assessment

• Criminal threshold may be crossed
• Meets Criminal Code hate-propaganda or counselling violence standards

This is where

• Surveillance intensifies
• Charges become plausible
• Lone-actor violence risk spikes

STAGE E — IMVE Operationalization (“Transition to action”)

Corresponds to: Level 8 (Instructional & Command Language)

Indicators

• Hypothetical violence rehearsed in detail
• “Give me some guys and weapons…”
• Target identification
• Calls to arm, drill, or prepare for enforcement actions

Canadian assessment: IMVE threat requiring intervention

This is the stage associated with:

• Coutts-style conspiracies
• Weapons seizures
• Arrests under terrorism-adjacent statutes

FROM GRIEVANCE TO MOBILIZATION
An IMVE-X Escalation Timeline of Diagolon, Second Sons, Active Clubs, and the Dominion Society (2018–2025)

2018–2019: Proto-Network Formation (IMVE Stage A: Grievance Formation & Normalization)

The roots of what would later become Diagolon lie not in a single organization, but in a loose, quarrelsome constellation of far-right online personalities, failed electoral campaigns, and grievance-driven livestream culture.

In 2018, Derek Harrison’s Plaid Army functioned less as a coherent group than as a broadcast hub. Harrison’s involvement in Faith Goldy’s Toronto mayoral campaign placed him in direct contact with openly white nationalist organizing, while Plaid Army livestreams normalized conspiracism, anti-media hostility, and mockery of democratic institutions.

At this stage, rhetoric focused on:

• “Free speech absolutism”
• Anti-CBC framing
• Anti-immigration grievance
• Irony-laden flirtation with extremist ideas

Analytic overlay: This period maps cleanly onto IMVE Stage A. There is no explicit violence advocacy, but the discursive groundwork is laid: journalists are enemies, institutions are illegitimate, and cruelty is entertainment.

Infighting is already visible — Plaid Army personalities feud with Yellow Vest organizers, La Meute affiliates, and other nationalist micro-groups. These conflicts are not moderating forces; they reward extremity by purging less radical actors.

2020: Accelerationist Turn (IMVE Stage B: Ideological Hardening)

The COVID-19 pandemic acts as a radicalizing accelerant.

In early 2020, Jeremy MacKenzie emerges as a central figure through livestreams that are far more explicit than Plaid Army content. He frames public health officials as tyrants and journalists as legitimate targets of abuse. Violence is not yet openly instructed — but it is morally permitted.

Language shifts markedly:

• “Tyranny”
• “No political solution”
• “The system is irredeemable”
• Calls to “accelerate” collapse

Analytic overlay: This is the transition into IMVE Stage B. The key marker is delegitimization of all non-violent political avenues. Violence is framed as defensive and inevitable, even if not yet operationalized.

Infighting intensifies. Harrison and MacKenzie drift from alliance to rivalry. Accusations of cowardice, compromise, or infiltration become common. Each schism pushes surviving factions further right.

2021: Diagolon Emerges (IMVE Stage C: Mobilization Signals)

By 2021, Diagolon is no longer merely an online joke or meme geography — it becomes a self-identified network.

Diagolon discourse introduces:

• Geographic myth-making (the “Diagonal” meme joke/fantasy)
• Shared symbolism
• Loyalty language
• Mock-military identity

Crucially, training and readiness enter the conversation. Physical fitness, discipline, and “men’s culture” are reframed as preparation for an inevitable conflict.

Analytic overlay: This marks the entry into IMVE Stage C. While still fragmented, Diagolon now shows:

• Identity hardening
• Internal purification
• Movement from protest to preparation

2022: The Convoy & Coutts Shock (IMVE Stage D: Intent Articulation)

The Freedom Convoy and Coutts border blockade are the decisive rupture.

Diagolon-aligned figures appear across convoy media spaces. The movement’s rhetoric becomes openly insurrectionary. The Coutts weapons seizure and murder conspiracy involving Diagolon-linked individuals shatters any remaining ambiguity about violent intent.

Language now includes:

• Praise for armed resistance
• Fantasies of executions
• Open talk of civil war
• Apocalyptic framing

Analytic overlay: This is the unmistakable shift into IMVE Stage D — credible violent extremist intent.

Infighting explodes afterward. Veterans 4 Freedom, once an ally, becomes a contested space. Leaders turn on one another over informants, optics, and cowardice. These fractures do not reduce risk — they fragment it, increasing lone-actor danger.

2023: Fragmentation & Reconstitution (IMVE Stage C → D Recycling)

Following arrests and scrutiny, Diagolon’s brand becomes radioactive. Rather than retreat, leaders rebrand.

This is where Second Sons begins to take shape, alongside deeper engagement with the Active Club model. The emphasis shifts:

• From broad populism → elite male brotherhood
• From mass protest → disciplined cells
• From jokes → ideology

Infighting continues, but now serves a strategic function: separating recruiters from militants.

Analytic overlay: Canadian IMVE frameworks often misread this as “decline.” It is not. This is organizational evolution under pressure.

2024: Two-Track Extremism (IMVE Stage C with Embedded Stage D)

By 2024, pre-Second Sons perfects dual messaging.

Publicly:

• Fitness
• Brotherhood
• Heritage
• “Remigration” as policy

Privately (podcasts, livestreams):

• Praise for Nazis
• Holocaust denial
• Explicit calls for deportation at gunpoint
• Calls to execute politicians

Active Clubs proliferate. Training becomes routine. Uniformity, masking, and martial aesthetics dominate.

Analytic overlay: This is IMVE Stage C with concealed Stage D intent — one of the most dangerous configurations in Canadian extremism because it maximizes recruitment while preserving deniability.

2025: Consolidation & Political Cover (IMVE Stage D → E Threshold)

In 2025, Second Sons claims (somewhat dubiously) thousands of sign-ups. Demonstrations become sharper, shorter, and more disciplined.

The Dominion Society emerges as a political arm, laundering the concept of ethnic cleansing through “policy” language:

• Immigration freezes
• Revocation of status
• “Making Canada less hospitable”

Active Clubs align openly with international neo-Nazi networks, including Hammerskin-linked actors. Exiles of the Golden Age conferences formalize ideology and transnational ties.

MacKenzie and Vriend’s private rhetoric crosses repeatedly into instructional violence, including rehearsed deportation scenarios involving weapons.

Analytic overlay: This is the IMVE Stage D → E threshold. The movement is no longer merely advocating violence — it is conceptually rehearsing it.

KEY ANALYTIC CONCLUSION

What looks like a series of disconnected groups — Plaid Army, Diagolon, Second Sons, Active Clubs, Dominion Society — is better understood as:

A single IMVE-X ecosystem undergoing adaptive mutation in response to pressure.

Each rebrand:

• Narrows membership
• Hardens ideology
• Shortens the distance between speech and action

Why This Matters

Canadian IMVE frameworks warn that language precedes violence. This timeline shows exactly how — and when — that happened.

By 2025, the movement has:

• Legitimated ethnic cleansing rhetorically
• Normalized armed enforcement hypotheticals
• Built physical infrastructure (training, cells)
• Created political cover for future action

This is not radicalization in progress. It is mobilization under disguise.

RHETORICAL ESCALATION MATRIX (2018–2025)
How language hardened, euphemisms thinned, and violence became policy

2018 — Grievance & Spectacle

Dominant language:

• “Free speech,” “patriot,” “censorship,” “globalists”
• Mockery, provocation, outrage framing

What’s happening rhetorically: Language is performative, not programmatic. The goal is attention and confrontation, not persuasion. Harassment is framed as accountability. Cruelty is normalized through humour and ridicule rather than ideology.

What is not yet sayable:

• Open racism
• Advocacy of violence
• Ethnic removal

Effect: Audiences are trained to enjoy confrontation and dehumanization without needing justification.

2019 — Delegitimization & Cynicism

Dominant language:

• “Rigged system,” “fake democracy,” “corrupt elites”
• “Peaceful protest doesn’t work”

What’s happening rhetorically: Democracy is reframed as the problem, not the solution. Losing politically becomes proof of conspiracy. Violence is still avoided explicitly, but non-violence is mocked.

New rhetorical move: Cynicism replaces outrage. Participation is pointless; disruption is meaningful.

Effect: The moral barrier protecting democratic norms weakens.

2020 — Justification & Inevitability

Dominant language:

• “Tyranny,” “medical fascism,” “war on citizens”
• “If it comes to it…”

What’s happening rhetorically: COVID acts as an accelerant. Politics becomes existential. Violence is framed as defensive, reactive, and forced upon us.

Key shift: Violence is no longer taboo — it is hypothetically reasonable.

What changes:

• Journalists and officials become “enemies”
• Harassment is framed as self-defense

Effect: Audiences rehearse moral permission for future violence.

2021 — Identity & Acceleration

Dominant language:

• “No political solution”
• “There is no going back”
• “Diagolon” as identity shorthand

What’s happening rhetorically: The movement stops arguing what it wants and starts asserting who it is. Identity replaces policy. The Diagolon meme functions as a loyalty test.

Critical escalation: Accelerationism enters the open. Conflict is not just possible — it is desired.

Effect: Violence becomes a future certainty rather than a hypothetical contingency.

2022 — Siege & Martyrdom

Dominant language:

• “Hold the line,” “political prisoners,” “state repression”
• “Occupation,” “resistance”

What’s happening rhetorically: The convoy and Coutts shift rhetoric from anticipation to practice-adjacent language. The movement frames itself as under siege.

Key transformation: Failure becomes martyrdom. Arrests validate belief.

What becomes sayable:

• Armed presence near protests
• Praise for endurance regardless of harm

Effect: Violence is no longer shocking — it is mismanaged rather than immoral.

2023 — Purification & Racialization

Dominant language:

• “Serious people,” “discipline,” “weak men”
• “Demographic threat,” “replacement”

What’s happening rhetorically: The movement contracts and hardens. Explicit racial framing moves to the center. Those uncomfortable with clarity are purged.

Major escalation: Ethnicity becomes the organizing principle, not grievance.

Effect: Violence shifts from defensive to corrective — something meant to fix society.

2024 — Euphemism & Professionalization

Dominant language:

• “Remigration,” “heritage,” “men’s club”
• “Training,” “professionalism”

What’s happening rhetorically: Public language softens while private language brutalizes. Euphemism is used intentionally to recruit.

Key tactic: Two-track messaging — sanitized optics paired with unfiltered podcasts and chats.

Effect: The movement broadens reach without diluting intent.

2025 — Candour & Command

Dominant language (private/long-form):

• “The Nazis were right”
• “Race war is here”
• “Deportation at gunpoint”
• “Execution of politicians”

Dominant language (public):

• “Remigration now”
• “Health, fitness, camaraderie”

What’s happening rhetorically: The euphemisms thin. Leaders speak plainly about ethnic cleansing, mass violence, and political executions — while acknowledging that public posts must remain sanitized.

Critical threshold crossed: Violence is no longer framed as inevitable or defensive — it is planned, instructional, and organizational.

Effect: Language no longer radicalizes; it directs.

CROSS-CUTTING PATTERNS

1. Euphemism follows violence, not the other way around: Euphemisms (“remigration,” “heritage”) appear after violent intent is settled, not before.

2. Infighting accelerates escalation: Each internal split removes moderating voices and promotes harder rhetoric as proof of loyalty.

3. Identity replaces argument: As rhetoric escalates, persuasion disappears. Language shifts from convincing outsiders to binding insiders.

4. Private speech predicts public action: The most extreme language always appears first in podcasts, streams, and closed chats — months or years before it manifests in street activity.

Bottom Line

By 2025, the rhetorical journey is complete:

• Violence is no longer an outcome.
• It is no longer a reaction.
• It is no longer a hypothetical.

It is a goal, articulated in plain language by leadership and supported by infrastructure designed to carry it out.

SCENARIO TREE: 2026–2028 ESCALATION PATHWAYS

Root conditions already visible by late 2025

• Network consolidation: CAHN describes a consolidated network with three branches: Diagolon (propaganda), Dominion Society (political), and Second Sons/Active Clubs (militant).
• Alliance-building and cross-network contact: Exiles of the Golden Age (EOTGA) functions as a bridge event with Active Clubs present and organizers affiliated with Hammerskins.
• Political normalization of “remigration”: Dominion Society formalizes the policy frame and organizational vehicle; founders include Daniel Tyrie and Greg Wycliffe.

These root conditions create two competing forces:

1. Professionalization (clean public face, recruitment funnels, incorporation/politics, “optics discipline”)
2. Radicalization competition (clout contests, accelerationist posturing, “prove you’re serious,” factional purity fights)

Infighting determines which force dominates at any given time.

Most likely scenario (2026–2028): “Fractured growth” with repeated PR cycles and localized intimidation

A) What happens

• Second Sons/Active Club activity expands unevenly: more small demonstrations, overpass/banner actions, gym/park training days, “community leafleting,” and media-targeted stunts—but not uniformly across Canada.
• Dominion Society remains the political funnel: it continues “remigration” messaging and tries to influence mainstream discourse (while maintaining plausible deniability about violence).
• Diagolon’s brand persists as cultural glue even if operational energy shifts toward Active Club and political vehicles.

B) Infighting dynamics that make this “most likely”

• Splintering is routine: personality-driven movements tend to cycle through feuds (money, credit, ideology, “who’s compromised”). That prevents durable national command-and-control.
• But splintering also creates more micro-cells: when people rage-quit a group, they often form a smaller one (“truer,” “more disciplined”), multiplying nodes and making the overall scene harder to map.
• Competition pushes rhetorical escalation even if organizational cohesion stays weak: leaders posture harsher to retain attention and donations.

C) Expected outputs you’d see

• Frequent short “propaganda events” (30–60 minutes, masked, uniform-ish aesthetics, flags/banners) designed to generate shareable media.
• More “philosophy + Männerbund” style convenings that blend ideology + recruitment and cultivate cross-border ties, similar to EOTGA.
• Increased platform churn: removals, reuploads, migrations to permissive services.

D) Risk profile

• Medium-to-high harassment/intimidation risk (journalists, activists, institutions).
• Moderate public-order risk from pop-up demos and confrontations.
• Low-to-moderate mass-casualty risk as a coordinated national plan—because factionalism interrupts discipline—but elevated lone-actor/cluster risk (see worst-case branch).

Best-case scenario: “Fragmentation + containment” (still ugly, but less dangerous)

A) What happens

• The network’s outward growth slows because infighting consumes time and trust, and because public exposure makes venues, gyms, and platforms harder to use.
• Dominion Society struggles to broaden beyond a niche base; it becomes a churn cycle of online propaganda and small symbolic actions.

B) Why infighting helps containment here

• Trust collapse: paranoia (“fed,” “grifter,” “traitor”) makes organizing harder.
• Recruitment costs rise: when outsiders see constant feuding, it reduces legitimacy and retention.
• Operational mistakes increase: sloppy planning and oversharing create legal and reputational consequences that further fracture the scene.

C) What you’d see

• More “callout streams,” doxx drama, and defections than real-world actions.
• Smaller and less frequent demonstrations; fewer cross-country tours; lower event attendance.
• Internal gatekeeping replaces outward expansion.

D) Risk profile

• Persistent hate/propaganda harms, but declining physical presence.
• Decreased likelihood of coordinated violence.

Worst-case scenario: “Militant convergence” plus a violence-adjacent split

This branch is the one that keeps security analysts up at night because infighting can actually accelerate violence in two ways: (1) by rewarding the most extreme faction, and (2) by producing defectors who want “proof” actions.

A) What happens

• One or more factions successfully merge into a tighter militant coalition (Active Club nodes, Second Sons elements, and older neo-Nazi networks).
• EOTGA-style convenings function as real alliance infrastructure, not just philosophy talk—especially where organizers have Hammerskins affiliation.
• Dominion Society continues political “remigration” messaging, creating a two-track ecosystem: attempting “respectable” policy face in concert with “street” intimidation capacity.

B) Infighting’s role in making it worse

Infighting does not necessarily reduce risk; it can select for “hardliners”:

• Purity spirals: factions compete to be “most committed,” escalating from euphemisms (“remigration”) to explicit dehumanization and then to “solutions.”
• Status through action: in clout economies, “doing something real” becomes a currency.
• Breakaway violence: a smaller splinter may decide the main group is too slow/soft—so they move from propaganda to targeted violence.

C) What you’d likely see first (precursors)

• A sharper division between a “PR wing” and a “direct action wing.”
• More coded celebration of past violence and “saints/martyrs” of the movement.
• Explicit fixation on training as preparation for inevitable conflict (race-war framing).
• Increased cross-promotion with international networks, including “folkish” and neo-Nazi channels.

D) Risk profile

• Higher probability of targeted violence (against perceived enemies: journalists, activists, minority communities, institutions).
• Higher likelihood of organized intimidation campaigns (coordinated stalking/threats).
• Still not guaranteed mass-casualty events, but the risk rises when alliances harden and when a splinter seeks notoriety.

Key branch points (what determines which scenario we enter)

1) Does the political arm successfully “sanitize” the movement?

If Dominion Society (and aligned messaging) succeeds in recruiting “normies,” the network grows in numbers—but creates internal backlash from hardliners who believe optics are betrayal.
That backlash can either:

• dissipate into drama (best-case), or
• form a militant splinter (worst-case).

2) Do Active Clubs remain decentralized lifestyle nodes or become a coordinated militant layer?

Decentralization lowers coordinated capacity but increases diffusion. Coordination increases capability and raises risk—especially when bridge events tie nodes together.

3) Does infighting stay “content-war” level or become “purge + action” level?

• Content-war infighting: accusations, defections, reputational attacks → tends toward best/most-likely.
• Purge/action infighting: vetting hardens, enemies list formalizes, “traitors” targeted → pushes worst-case.

Scenario Summary

Most likely (fractured growth): More small rallies + propaganda stunts + training days; political remigration push continues; frequent feuds; higher harassment risk, moderate violence risk.

Best case (fragmentation + containment): Infighting erodes trust; fewer real-world actions; shrinking events; online hate persists but physical risk drops.

Worst case (militant convergence): Bridge events + older neo-Nazi ties + hardliner splinter produce higher risk of targeted violence and coordinated intimidation.